Abstract: While decentralization is a prominent theme in contemporary natural resource policy and management discourse, questions have been raised concerning the sustainability of participatory approaches. Drawing on theoretical and empirical research on common pool resource management and participation, we develop a framework to evaluate community-level stakeholders' potential suitability for engagement in co-management. Four criteria are assessed: stake in the resource, discount rate, social capital and capacity (leadership, organizational, enforcement of rules and knowledge). Inclusion of local actors who fi t the framework in a governance arrangement could lead to more sustainable outcomes. We tested this screening strategy by assessing potential organizational partners for comanagement of non-wood forest products in community forests in Cameroon.
I Introduction
In recent decades, there has been a shift globally from a top-down, state-centred model of management of natural resources to a more decentralized approach in which a range of actors participate in governance. This powersharing strategy is grounded, in part, in the idea that providing local stakeholders with a sense of shared ownership and responsibility for natural resources will improve outcomes (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000) . By coordinating state and non-state partners, it is possible to make more informed decisions that are more likely to be implemented and result in more effective management of resources (Conley and Moote, 2003) .
Co-management, it is argued, can allow environmental, social and economic issues to be addressed in ways that leverage complementarities. We have chosen to use the generic term 'co-management' in this paper to refer to the various strategies commonly called collaborative management, community-based natural resource management or adaptive collaborative management, although we recognize that there are slight differences in * Author for correspondence. Email: hpb5@cornell.edu. these defi nitions. In many countries, the focus has been on allowing the active participation in management of local people whose livelihoods depend on the natural environment, in order to achieve poverty reduction and conservation goals. While implementation of such strategies is uneven and incomplete (Sundar, 2001) , this general approach has been embraced by national leaders and policy makers in many developing countries as well as aid bureaucrats and technical specialists in donor countries (Bebbington et al., 2004; Virtanen, 2005) .
The emphasis on the participation of local stakeholders in natural-resource management has led to an examination of how such an approach has been implemented and its successes and limitations. The outcomes of some decentralization schemes and questions about how they can respond to changing circumstances have led some to suggest that such an approach is overly optimistic (Barrett et al., 2001; Campbell et al., 2001) . Krishna (2004) sees these schemes as premised on four assumptions that are only partial truths: that communities are homogeneous, that traditional domains of work are natural and always contribute to resource conservation, that decentralization ensures effi cient resource management, and that participation and selfhelp are the keys to equitable and sustainable resource use. Agrawal and Gibson (1999) echo the criticism of this participatory approach with its apparent assumption that communities are small spatial units with homogenous social structures, common interests and shared norms.
Others criticize such participatory management schemes for paying limited attention to the nestedness of community-based institutions in the external social, institutional and physical environment (Agrawal, 2001a) . Another constraining factor in decentralization programmes is that failure to award secure, long-term rights to resources limits communities' investment in resource management (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2001a; Knox et al., 2002) . Multi-stakeholder negotiations common in participatory approaches often fail to recognize the power differential that exists among stakeholders (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2001b) . The more powerful actors in communities manipulate the situation to benefi t themselves, while disadvantaged groups, such as women or ethnic minorities, are increasingly marginalized (Shackleton et al., 2002; Campbell et al., 2003; Bebbington et al., 2004) . Furthermore, the weakness of existing institutions at all levels contributes to the inability to implement strategies emerging from interactions (Barrett et al., 2001; Oyono, 2004a) .
From this critical review, we see that local participation in co-management, as a generic natural resource management and sustainable development technique, is not a useful policy and management prescription. There is a need to think through governance as it is practised in localized contexts and to identify mechanisms that serve as an effective check on bureaucratic and economic elites, and which result in an enabling framework for action and resource allocation.
While recognizing the criticisms and problems of co-management schemes, one way we attempt to strengthen their outcome is by proposing a strategy for screening and selecting local candidates for participation in such comanagement arrangements applied to forest management. Rather than empowering a set of local actors based solely on their ability to represent various interest groups in an effort to ensure fairness, we focus on the resources that actors bring to collective management and policy processes (Wolf and Primer, 2006) . Our interest lies in connecting the theoretical literature on institutional analysis and design for sustainable forest management at the local level to the practical problem of implementation of participatory models of development and conservation. Although we recognize that the ways external stakeholders, including the state, function in co-management arrangements are crucial to the success of these schemes, such assessment is beyond the scope of this paper.
We begin by assuming that in a localized resource-management setting, there are community-level individuals and collective actors who could contribute positively to co-management of natural resources. The problem, however, is how to identify them among the population of potential partners. We propose an analytic framework for the assessment of candidates. We derive our criteria through a review of the theoretical and empirical research on common-pool resource management and participation as applied to forest management. Those who fi t this framework, within a co-management arrangement, would be able to adapt to changing circumstances and learn how to better manage natural resources in a sustainable manner. We then apply the framework to the case of the management of non-wood forest products (NWFPs) in community forests in Cameroon, where there has been a recent legislative change devolving management of a portion of public forest land. Recognizing that the local partners in co-management identifi ed through application of this framework are not a static, homogeneous group, we conclude with a critical appraisal of our screening protocol and the general notion of environmental governance.
II Desired attributes of co-management partners
Research on the development of institutions in localized settings and the contribution of these institutions to sustainable management of common-pool resources are central to the discussion of co-management. This research has demonstrated that local resource users have the interest and knowledge to engage in management and can formulate endogenous institutions, or rules in use, to resolve resourceaccess problems effi ciently (Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992) . Many studies have attempted to defi ne the conditions under which groups of resource users will organize and sustainably govern the resources upon which they depend (Agrawal, 2001a) . In relation to forest resources in particular, Ostrom (1999) outlines attributes of resources and users that would enhance the sustainable management of common-pool forest resources. Additionally, in the development literature, Pretty (2002) contends that sustainability in natural-resource management is an emergent property in systems that are high not only in natural capital, but also in human and social capital.
Based on these cross-cutting insights and a broad range of empirical sources reviewed below, we identify four core criteria or attributes to look for in potential partners in comanagement arrangements: their stake in the resource, the discount rate or time horizon they attach to the resource, their social capital, and the capacities they can contribute to the governance regime. Each of these criteria is reviewed below, with particular attention given to social capital and capacity, a pair of concepts we believe to be essential but subject to varied interpretations in the literature.
While some defi nitions of capacity overlap with certain aspects of social capital, in our approach to empirical assessment of potential co-management partners, we defi ne the two concepts as distinct.
Major stakeholders
The salience of a forest resource to a given actor is considered to be important for predicting that actor's willingness to contribute to its conservation and management (Ostrom, 1999) . For stakeholders to be invested in the sustainable management of a resource, they must either be dependent on the resource for a signifi cant portion of their livelihood or security, or they must attach other values to it (for example, ethical, spiritual or cultural value). In defi ning the criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management, important stakeholders are thus defi ned as those who are closely connected to the forest. This can be determined on the basis of seven dimensions: proximity to the forest; pre-existing rights; dependency; poverty; local knowledge; the importance of the forest to their culture; and existing power deficits (Colfer and CIFOR Methods Testing Team, 1999 -CIFOR being the Center for International Forestry Research). Research has indicated that it is important that those who have a signifi cant stake in a resource be included in management, as otherwise they might undermine the process because their interests are not adequately represented (Agarwal, 2001) .
Low discount rate
One criterion for sustainable forest management is that people link their futures and their children's futures to the condition of the forest resources (Colfer and CIFOR Methods Testing Team, 1999) . According to economists, the discount rate measures the impatience of consumers, in the sense that consumption in the future is given less weight than consumption now, with a decline in weight for each additional period (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995) .
Within a population, there is likely to be variance in the discount rate of actors. A low discount rate reflects concern for fair intergenerational access to natural resources and a personal interest in continued access. Evidence that people in forest communities are capable of applying a low discount rate to local forests includes generalized recognition of the need to balance numbers of people with the abundance and productivity of the natural resource; more directly, wholesale destruction of forest resources by local communities is rare (Colfer and CIFOR Methods Testing Team, 1999) . In line with Ostrom (1999) , a suffi ciently low discount rate is seen here as a positive attribute of users in enhancing sustainable forest management.
Social capital
The popularity of the concept of social capital has grown dramatically in recent years, largely due to the work of Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1993) , providing a nexus among the social sciences (Robison and Flora, 2003) .
While diffi cult to defi ne, four basic components are mentioned in many defi nitions of social capital: these are the sources of social capital; the factors that generate and sustain it (norms, social networks, culture and institutions); the individual and collective actions made possible by this infrastructure; and the consequences and results of these actions. These consequences may be positive (an increase in benefi ts, development, democracy or social equality) or negative (exclusion, exploitation or an increase in inequality) (Krishna and Uphoff, 1999; Pretty and Ward, 2001; Flores and Rello, 2004) . In the development literature, social capital is often defi ned as constituting both structural (roles, rules, precedents and social networks) and cognitive elements (norms, values, reciprocity, truthfulness, solidarity and trust) (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000; Krishna and Uphoff, 2002) .
It is argued that the presence of social capital in a community enables the process of social learning, which fosters innovation and adaptation of technologies embedded in individual and social transformation (Krishna and Uphoff, 2002; Pretty and Buck, 2002) . The important role that social learning can play in the management of community forests has been highlighted by Buck et al. (2001) . It involves building the capacity of communities to learn about the complex ecological and physical complexity in their ecosystems, which leads to decisions to act in different ways (Pretty and Smith, 2004) . Therefore, the social capital of stakeholder groups within a community may be an indicator of potential for success in adapting the management of forest resources to changing circumstances.
Since social capital is diffi cult to measure directly for empirical purposes, proxy indicators are often used (Narayan and Cassidy, 2001; Krishna, 2002) . Such proxies for structural social capital often include density of active membership in social networks. For cognitive social capital, proxies include measures of trust and the strength of norms of reciprocity and sharing (Krishna and Shrader, 2000) .
Applied to structural indicators in rural India, it was found that membership in informal organizations was a better indicator of social capital than formal organizations, particularly membership in labour-sharing groups (Krishna and Uphoff, 1999; Krishna, 2001) . Results of the administration of the Global Social Capital Survey in Ghana and Uganda showed that one of the indicators of social capital was membership in informal networks (Narayan and Cassidy, 2001 ). The implication is that these informal social groups, due to their mutually benefi cial nature, are more likely to exhibit and foster the cognitive aspects of social capital, such as trust, solidarity and sharing.
This brief review indicates that while there are varied approaches to operationalizing the assessment of social capital, there is broad acknowledgement of its importance as a coordination mechanism and a critical resource for sustainable development.
Capacity
At the community level, emphasis is often placed on the capacity of individuals or organizations to work together, innovate and accomplish collective goals. Increased capacity can contribute to empowerment, which is defi ned as becoming able to participate in one's community or exert ownership and infl uence over important events in one's life (Rappaport, 1987) . Capacity is then linked to increased scope for participation as well as the ability to advance collaborative decision making in a community context (Chaskin, 2001; HerbertCheshire, 2001 ). Capacity, simply put, is a set of tools for achieving a combination of objectives (Ribot, 2004) . Capacity has been broadly defined to encompass intellectual, organizational, social, political, cultural, material, practical or fi nancial elements.
In order to operationalize for purposes of assessment what is clearly an abstract resource, we identify four critical aspects of capacity, which we consider to be important for the management of natural resources by community stakeholders.
a Ability to lead: The fi rst aspect of capacity is demonstrated leadership ability, which is defined to be leadership that is concerned with the welfare of the whole group and enables community members to develop abilities and skills (Baland and Platteau, 1996) . Chaskin (2001) , in discussing the social-agency aspect of community capacity, suggests that leadership is an individual or a collective resource. This resource applies particular aspects of human capital such that individual community members, as leaders, act as change agents to mobilize others and catalyse action. Such leadership is important in a comanagement process, as a leader will not only have the ability to represent stakeholders in a governance arrangement, but also to foster effective participation by others.
b Ability to organize: Secondly, we focus on the ability to organize. Ostrom (1999) stresses the need for prior organizational experience as another variable enhancing self-organization surrounding forest resources. Organizational and administrative skills learned in any group or organizational context can be considered a capacity for community management of natural resources, as the skills are transferable from one context to another.
c Ability to enforce rules: Third, we identify the capacity of a group to enforce rules and regulations as essential to the coherence of management (Ostrom, 1990; Gibson et al., 2005) . Agrawal (2001b) noted that when local forest councils in India were able to undertake monitoring and enforcement of rules, their forests were typically rated as being in very good condition.
d Traditional or indigenous knowledge: This is the fourth element of capacity we include in our assessment protocol. Local knowledge is now widely recognized as a resource in the management of the natural environment (Schulz et al., 1994; Sherry and Myers, 2002) . Indigenous knowledge refers to ideas, experiences, practices or information that have been generated locally, or are generated elsewhere but transformed by local people and incorporated into the local way of life. Indigenous knowledge incorporates local technologies, but also cultural, social and economic aspects that are shared and accumulated in social groups (Okali et al., 1994) . Like other forms of knowledge, indigenous knowledge is not evenly distributed within or across communities. Its distribution is often dependent on such characteristics as the capacity of individuals to manage knowledge or the monopolization of knowledge by different social, economic or gender groups as infl uenced by cultural norms (Haverkort et al., 1991; Leach and Fairhead, 2001; Krishna, 2004) . In managing natural resources at the community level, it is therefore important to access local knowledge about them, so that it can be used in strengthening a co-management arrangement.
III Case study: management of NWFPs in community forests of Cameroon
Recent years have seen the new trend in participatory governance extended to the forestry sector, with decentralization of management to local actors (D'Silva, 1997; Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003) . Cameroon has been following a process of decentralization in the forestry sector since 1994, with the passing of the Forest Act. One part of this legislation concerns the transfer of management responsibilities and powers to village communities for the creation of community forests.
The 1994 law classifi es forests in Cameroon into two main categories: the permanent forest estate -or classified forest -which can only be used for forestry or as wildlife habitat and the non-permanent forest estate consisting of forested land which can be converted to non-forest uses (Djeumo, 2001) . A community forest is defi ned as a forest in the non-permanent domain that is subjected to a management agreement between a village community and the state administration in charge of forests. It is equipped with a simple plan for its management, conservation and exploitation for the interests of the communities, with the technical support of the forestry administration (Vabi et al., 2000; Oyono, 2004b) .
Initially, most community-forest management committees in Cameroon were primarily focused on harvesting timber. The drafting in late 2002 of the new Manual of the Procedures for the Acquisition and Norms for the Management of Community Forests has, however, placed more emphasis on the exploitation of NWFPs (Community Forest Unit, 2002) . It also opens up the possibility of new management arrangements for such resources within the current local management structure of community forests. These NWFPs, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, consist of goods of biological origin other than wood, derived from forests, other wooded land and trees outside forests (Belcher, 2003) .
The more prominent integration of the collective management of NWFPs in community forests represents a change from the prevailing customary system of management. Although technically controlled by the government, normally these traditional products are managed for food, medicine, construction and religious purposes by a complex system of informal rules and norms at the household, corporate lineage and village levels (Diaw, 1997 and 1998) . Furthermore, the commercialization of NWFPs in Cameroon has increased dramatically in the last 20 years due to both domestic and international trade, leading to concerns about over-harvesting (Ndoye et al., 1999) . Markets revolve around traders or market intermediaries known as buyam/sellams, most of whom are women, who both buy and sell NWFPs for profi t.
The formalization of the collective management of NWFPs in community forests provided an interesting and practical opportunity to apply the assessment framework derived above. Which local actors could be the most effective partners in a participatory-governance arrangement for a common-pool resource such as NWFPs in a Cameroonian community forest? In contemplating the practical and thorny question of whose participation should be sought and whose competencies can contribute to good governance, we seek to offer an assessment tool. While we do not have longitudinal data to evaluate the outcomes attached to the various organizational confi gurations that are emerging in the study area, this case provides a chance to refl ect critically on the methodology we propose to screen candidate partners.
Measurement and methods
Analytical framework used in research: As defi ned above, and as expressed graphically in Figure 1 , we identify four general criteria for assessing groups of NWFP actors within a community, who would be able to contribute positively to the governance of a system undergoing change:
• an important stake in the management of NWFPs; • a low discount rate in relation to the NWFP resource; • high social capital; and • capacity, as defi ned by demonstrated leadership ability, prior organizational experience, capacity to enforce rules and regulations, and knowledge of the sustainable harvesting practices of the NWFP species under study.
Research area:
Research focused on the collection and management of NWFPs in nine primarily agriculture-based Bantu communities in the humid forest zone of southern Cameroon (Figure 2 ). (Of the study communities found in the Eastern Province, several had camps of Baka tribes associated with the villages. However, for the purposes of this research, the focus was on the management of NWFPs by the Bantu, as they are more integrated with the local cash economy and more involved in the management of the community forests. Of the nine villages involved in the research, only one -Nkol-bogo I -did not have or was not in the process of obtaining a legalized community forest.) The villages were located in areas representing a difference in volume of trade in the three study species, which were identifi ed as three of the nine dominant species in the markets of the humid forest zone: Gnetum sp., Irvingia sp. and Ricinodendron heudelotii (Ruiz Perez et al., 2000) . Six villages located in the Eastern Province, in the division of HautNyong and the sub-division of Lomié, had a low volume of trade in the Gnetum species and bush mango (Irvingia sp.). A high volume of trade in Gnetum and njansang (Ricinodendron heudelotii) was found in the three villages in While not a basis for national inference, study of multiple communities enhances variance in our case-study data and allows us to qualitatively assess patterns of interest to our particular research questions.
Data collection methods: Data collection followed a mixed methodological approach, with some data being collected using a quantitative survey and others collected using qualitative techniques, including semistructured interviews and focus groups (Patton, 1990) . Important stakeholders at the community level involved in the collection of the selected NWFPs for this study were determined using the seven dimensions of the 'Who Counts' Matrix (Colfer, 1999; Colfer and CIFOR Methods Testing Team, 1999) . The resulting assessments in each village were then validated through discussions with government offi cials and community members and through triangulation with other data available.
In each village, Bantu collectors of NWFPs, particularly the study species, were identifi ed by snowball sampling (Patton, 1990; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998) and anonymous individual surveys were administered. Since the collectors of the study species were almost exclusively women, men also were surveyed (though they were not necessarily NWFP collectors) in order to broaden the community sample. Members of the community-forest management committee, who are predominantly men, were also surveyed. In total, the surveys covered between 20 percent and 75 percent of all the households in a given village, depending on the size of the village. In all, 155 surveys were administered. Women represented 71 percent of respondents and men 29 percent, with both groups representing an age range of 16-77 years.
The discount rate was assessed by presenting survey respondents with statements
Figure 2 Location of study communities in Southern Cameroon
concerning the future harvesting of NWFPs and asking them to reply on a Likert scale from 'Strongly Agree' to 'Strongly Disagree' (McIver and Carmines, 1981) . Qualitative data were also collected while people were refl ecting on their responses to the survey questions.
In order to assess the levels of social capital among stakeholders in a community both quantitative and qualitative measures were used. Attempts were made to quantify the social capital embedded within and between groups of stakeholders using an adaptation of other social capital assessment tools for the Cameroonian context (Krishna and Shrader, 2000; Krishna, 2001; Krishna and Uphoff, 2002) . The cultural appropriateness of the questions was assessed in consultation with CIFOR Cameroon researchers and the fi eld assistant, and small modifi cations were made to fi t the rural Cameroon context. Factor analysis of these data, unlike results in some previous social capital studies did not result in the construction of a Social Capital Index. Results revealed that very few questions designed to measure social capital were correlated with each other and factor loadings were such that they did not really simplify the data. Furthermore, the Cronbach's alpha was very low indicating that the questions are unreliable in measuring social capital in this study.
The difference in these results from other studies may possibly be explained by a low sample size, as although the sample is adequate for the number of variables, it is at the low end of what is considered ideal for Factor Analysis (Field, 2000) . However, an important reason for the different results may be that although the questions have proven useful in other developing country contexts, and appeared valid for the cultural context of rural Cameroon, they were not reliable in capturing the phenomenon of social capital for this situation. If a better quantitative measure of social capital is to be achieved it would require retesting of the World Bank survey on a much larger number of people in Cameroon. However, we feel that the manifestation of social capital is likely fairly context specifi c, and cannot be reduced to a set of questions that successfully measure it the same way in rural areas in every developing country. However, in depth study of Cameroon and its society would help in developing questions that could more accurately measure social capital in that context. After being forced to abandon this method, we decided to use membership in informal groups as a proxy measure of social capital among stakeholders.
Informal groups are defined as those groupings of people that come together for the purpose of mutual aid, such as labour-sharing groups or savings and loan groups, but whose organization and function is not dictated by external authorities. Those who were members of informal groups were considered to exhibit high structural and cognitive social capital. Formal groups in the research area were defined as constituted committees, created by government representatives external to the community, to perform some local function or administrative task. Another type of formal group in villages included those that were created by local people and then legally recognized by the government. This latter type of locally organized formal group was introduced to Cameroon as part of rural reform in the early 1990s (Oyono and Temple, 2003) .
To measure leadership, survey respondents were asked to rate their group leaders and also to express how their particular group made decisions. The way in which decisions were made in a group was used as an indication of the leadership style prevalent among stakeholders. Membership in all community groups, both formal and informal, was surveyed as an indicator of capacity to organize as well as of prior organizational experience. The implication was that members of any group learnt basic organizational and administrative skills that can be transferred from one context to another. In order to assess the capacity of a group to enforce rules and regulations, survey respondents were asked to refl ect on their groups and outline what the procedure would be if someone in the group did not respect the rules of the group. The answers were then grouped and assigned a numerical code for statistical analysis. The survey results were supplemented by the collection of qualitative data. To measure local knowledge of the research species, questions were asked in meetings with men and women to evaluate their knowledge of the target species. Quantitative data on knowledge of the plants was also collected via the survey.
Data collection took place during the months of June-August 2002, May-September 2003 and February-March 2004. The fi rst author, H.C. Peach Brown, collected all the data, with the help of a fi eld assistant in each region, who provided translation from French to the local language as needed. Analysis and interpretation of qualitative data was done following procedures outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Patton (1990) . All statistical data analyses (descriptive treatment, factor analysis and regression) were done using SPSS 12.0 for Windows. H.C. Peach Brown, was associated with the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) while in Cameroon, but the research was conducted independently.
Results and discussion: Using the assessment framework
Stake in the management of NWFPs: Results show that there are no formal groups organized around the collection, marketing or management of NWFPs in the research villages. In all the villages, women and their children, particularly girls, are the primary collectors and daily managers of the three study species and of NWFPs in general. Primarily, the study species were an important traditional food source for families, and were also being marketed in increased quantities. The women mainly collect and sell individually, although they sometimes form ad hoc groups for labour sharing. It is important to note that women do not have secure access to NWFPs within the traditional tenure system, as access is based on a woman's relationship to the men in her family (Tiani, 2001 ).
The results indicated that although income from the sale of NWFPs was not the main livelihood activity, it did provide for concrete family needs. These included small daily household needs for lamp oil and soap as well as larger, more intermittent expenses such as schooling and clothing (Table 1) . Sunderland et al. (2004) note the predominance of this 'coping strategy' in Africa, where income from NWFPs provides cash at times of economic need, such as the payment of school fees or when seasonal income is low. Women also keep a portion of their NWFP harvest for traditional household use.
Women who are not as well off were more likely to invest substantial time and effort in collecting Gnetum. This was particularly evident in areas where there were many opportunities to sell the product, but at a very low price. Market studies of NWFPs in Cameroon showed that for disadvantaged groups, such as divorced women and widows, the NWFP trade was an important survival strategy (Ruiz Pérez et al., 2002) .
Discount rate: As stated previously, the discount rate was assessed by presenting survey respondents with statements concerning the future harvesting of NWFPs and asking them to reply on a Likert scale from 'Strongly Agree' to 'Strongly Disagree'. All respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statements. It should be noted that the reliability analysis of the relevant survey questions to measure the discount rate indicated that they were reliable. (Cronbach's alpha = 0.757) (Carmines and Zeller, 1979) . The low variance in responses, however, could be explained in several ways. It may be a result of soliciting evaluations of statements that were worded too strongly, that is, all respondents perceived voicing dissent to be in violation of personal values and local norms. It also could represent a true refl ection of their attitude, even if that did not lead to consistent behaviour. While the local people appear to attach value to future access to the NWFP resource, efforts to measure variance in discount rates quantitatively among actors in the population produced no useful results. Qualitative results indicated the responsibility people felt to protect the resources for the future. As one women said, 'Who do I do anything for except my grandchildren?' Many expressed concern that the plants they have known and used all their lives will not be there in the future. In the Eastern Province, people were particularly concerned about timber companies cutting down one tree species (Baillonella toxisperma) that also provides very useful and commercially valuable oil. One older woman recounted how when she takes her grandson to the forest with her, she points out the small njansang trees and gives him the responsibility to weed around and protect the plants. She told him that those trees would be for his future wife to use and so it was his responsibility to protect them for her.
Social capital:
Results show that villagers worked together in a variety of formal and informal groups in the study sites (Table 2) . Many of these formal groups were created by government representatives external to the community, to perform some local function or administrative task, including the Committee to Fight AIDS, the Village Development Committee and the Committee to Maintain the Roads. For the most part, they did not appear to function regularly. More active, publicly chartered groups included Parent Committees charged with overseeing village school administration. Other committees included groups charged with the maintenance of the village well and water pump or with decisions regarding the use of royalty payments from timber companies awarded access to the village's forests. Membership in these formal committees was dominated by men, although most committees have at least one woman member.
Other formal groups in villages, introduced to Cameroon as part of rural reform in the 1990s, were common initiatives groups (CIGs) created by local people and then legalized by the government. In two villages in the Central Province, CIGs are particularly strong in men, in areas where they functioned as a marketing cooperative for cocoa, traditionally a 'man's crop'. CIGs were commonly formed by women in this area to produce or market agricultural products, though, with names refl ecting the cooperative intent of the group. Particularly in the Eastern Province, groups of people form another type of legalized group called an 'association', which is more open in membership than CIGs or cooperatives. In the Eastern Province, it is not uncommon to observe the whole village to be members of the community forest association, as signified by a nominal payment of dues. The community forest in the Central Province was organized as a cooperative, which differs from an association in having a more complex management structure (Djeumo, 2001) .
A common and important kind of informal group in Cameroon is the fi nancial tontine, a rotating savings and loan group.In fi nancial tontines, members contribute a weekly amount of money, with each member taking turns to receive the contribution of the whole group, thus getting access to a lump sum from a series of small contributions. In other cases, the money might be shared among all the members at a predetermined time, in some cases with interest, if it has been invested in some way. Normally a portion of the savings is reserved in an emergency fund which members may access for serious health situations or funerals. Sometimes the members may be able to receive credit from the group and pay it back with interest at a later time. Weekly meetings for contributions and discussion of business are usually held on Sunday afternoons, right after the church service and sometimes with a communal meal. Tontines were present in all but one of the study villages (Table 2) , with most villages having more than one. In almost all cases, these were started by women and are run by women, although there are often a few male members. Although not legalized by the government as are CIGs, associations or cooperatives, fi nancial tontines are formally organized in having executive offi cers.
Money is also shared in other groups called cotisations, where a few women or men agree to pool a certain amount of money on a fi xedterm basis. At defi ned intervals, on a rotating basis, each member receives all the money in a lump sum payment. 
Note: Since a school draws children from several villages, not all villages have a Parent Committee; but they send parent representatives to the committee in the village where the school was located. Churches function in a similar manner, with members for church groups coming from a number of villages. Therefore, some villages that do not have those groups send representatives to the neighbouring village committee. † CPDM is the political party of Cameroon's President, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement. ‡ The village development committee (VDC) and the timber royalty committee (TRC) sometimes function together. ∆ Farmer groups are either associations (Assoc) or common initiative groups (CIG). * CF is the community-forest group, which is either formed as an association or a cooperative (Coop) . See text for further explanations.
The members of fi nancial tontines or CIGs often subdivide into smaller groups and form informal labour groups for working in each other's fi elds or participate in internal cotisations. For example, in one fi nancial tontine, the women split into three groups to work regularly in each others' fi elds. Some women in a CIG formed an ad hoc cotisation by collecting a determined number of bundles of Gnetum and then rotating who would benefi t from the sale of what was collected. There were many groups formed in the churches in the villages that consisted of mainly prayer groups or Bible study groups, but which also could be labour groups to work in a parish fi eld.
Quantitative survey results on the distribution of group membership appear to support the qualitative data in that women are more likely to be members of informal groups than men. When membership in all group types, including government-initiated committees, legalized groups or informal groups, is explored using regression analysis, men were found to have a significantly higher involvement than women (p = 0.003). However, when membership in groups other than externally charted organizations was treated as the dependent variable, the difference between men and women's involvement was no longer signifi cant (p = 0.504). When membership in informal groups (i.e., financial tontines and labour-sharing groups) was explored through regression, women were found to be signifi cantly more engaged than men (p = 0.091). When village of origin was controlled for, the difference between the sexes became more prominent (p = 0.050).
These results may indicate that women, because of their higher involvement in such mutually supportive groups, may be better able to build on already existing social capital. This social capital could then be used to facilitate social learning in a changing resourcemanagement situation. Women's presence in natural-resource management groups has been shown to facilitate the building and use of social capital leading to better outcomes (Westerman et al., 2005) .
While group affi liation can serve as a progressive resource, membership in groups can be associated with the 'dark side' of social capital if it leads to an effective capacity to exclude outsiders so as to monopolize collective resources (Bowles and Gintis, 2002) . Group affi liations are viewed here as being a positive developmental resource if local groups demonstrate overlapping membership rosters (i.e., the presence of individuals spanning multiple boundaries) rather than mutually exclusive memberships. Survey results indicated that people are often part of more than one village group at a time. Other than being differentiated for the most part on the basis of gender, the formation of groups in the villages appeared to be open. Crosstabs analysis with a Pearson Chi squared test showed that in none of the groups was membership determined on the basis of corporate lineage, clan, age or level of education (p = 0.05).
Capacity:
The results of leadership-capacity measurements showed that the various types of groups (CIGs, fi nancial tontines, laboursharing groups, church groups, communityforest management committees, youth groups and formal community committees) within the research villages appeared to demonstrate rather homogenous and decentralized decisionmaking routines. Approximately 80 percent of respondents said that when a decision needed to be made in their group, all the members held a meeting and then made the decision together. There were no signifi cant differences found between group types and decision-making procedures (N = 134; p = 0.616). There were also no signifi cant differences in patterns of responses between men and women. These results may indicate that an accepted pattern of leadership in villages is one that fosters the participation of others.
Beyond decision-making protocols, when asked to rate the quality of leadership in their groups, most said that the management was 'very good' (68.8 percent) and an additional 23.9 percent rated it as 'good'. Again, this high rating may be an indication that group members viewed their leaders as being concerned with the welfare of the whole group. There was a signifi cant difference (N = 138; p = 0.017) between group types, however, as only the community-forest management committees were not generally rated as 'very good.' Since community-forest management committees are new organizational structures in these communities and in some cases have had internal problems, this may explain the cautious rating.
While the functioning of the groups was routinely rated high across both formal and informal groups, complaints did occasionally surface as to the handling of fi nances. In one CIG for marketing cocoa, the treasurer had stolen money and then had left the village so that the group was never able to recover what had been stolen. Community-forest management committees also experienced problems with embezzlement. For the most part, fi nancial tontines functioned quite well; however, there were rare instances of people defaulting on loans or stealing from the till, leading typically to the dissolution of the group.
In measuring the capacity to organize by analysing prior organizational experience, assessment of group membership showed that of the 149 people surveyed, only 6% were not members of some type of group. It is interesting to note that this high level of involvement does not differ on the basis of age (N = 149; p = 0.823). This very high level of group involvement in the research areas means that most people have the opportunity to learn administration skills and how to organize in some way. However, the members of the informal groups, particularly the tontines organized by women, likely had more opportunity to develop organizational capacity over a longer period of time.
Tontines functioned more regularly than other more formalized groups by holding regular weekly meetings. Furthermore, since the structure of tontines was not dictated by an externally imposed legal framework, members were freer to experiment and develop appropriate structures that worked over time.
In measuring the capacity of a group to enforce rules and regulations, the most common answers to the survey question refl ecting on group procedure in cases of rule breaking (whether within a CIG, fi nancial tontine, laboursharing group, community-forest management committee, youth group or formal community committee) was that a defi nite procedure was followed when someone broke the rules. First, the person would be warned and counselled as to how to change. If this did not work, they then would be fi ned and fi nally excluded from membership if they persisted in breaking the rules. The types of responses did not differ across group types (N = 134; p = 0.134). This consistency of response across formal and informal groups indicates that there is a common established procedure as to how to deal with such situations.
However, from the qualitative data, it was not always evident that groups actually followed their outlined procedure. Many groups, particularly the tontines that have had a long history of well-established norms of conduct, have functioned for years without any major problems, and so they have had no need to follow the outlined procedure. Some more recently organized groups, such as the community forest management committee, have had problems with some members of the leadership stealing money from the group and have tried to follow the procedure with little success. In other groups, when people have refused to return money they have stolen, it has led to the collapse of the group instead of the exclusion of the guilty party. In such cases, the group often re-forms after the problem has dissipated, in which case the offender might not be allowed to participate.
In summary, it is not clear that there is the capacity to enforce rules and regulations among diverse community members. This could be due to many factors, such as the small size of the village and the interrelatedness of some groups. Also, with a diversity of clans and the power relations within the villages, the enforcement of rules in some groups becomes more diffi cult. Enforcement of rules applied to outsiders appeared to be easier than those applied to village members, as outsiders were regularly excluded from harvesting some products from the village forest. Women did, however, regularly exclude fellow villagers from collecting njansang fruit from trees on their traditional land. In addition, in the informal groups led by women, the enforcement of norms and rules of conduct seemed to be easier. Whether this could be translated into a capacity for NWFP collectors to enforce a system of regulation among community members in a community forest is uncertain.
From the results of the measurement of knowledge regarding sustainable harvesting practices for the target species, women appeared to have more detailed knowledge than men about the life cycle of the plants. For ex-ample, for the bush mango and njansang, they knew the timing of new leaves, of fl owering, and when fruits are mature and fall from the tree. Survey results also showed that women demonstrated knowledge of good harvesting practices and of the regeneration rates of Gnetum, learnt through their daily interaction with the plants. Data from focus groups showed that both men and women have a good general knowledge of the plants, particularly the areas of the forest and the soil conditions in which you would fi nd them. Survey results presented on knowledge of the research species are for the most part based on the questions answered by women, as the men surveyed refused to answer questions about plants that they did not collect.
When investigating knowledge of good harvesting practices, women said that for the tree species, collecting the fallen fruit was the best method. Both bush mango and njansang are very tall, so it is diffi cult to climb to harvest the fruit; also, njansang is considered to be a fragile tree and so climbing it might cause damage to the branches. Since it is the nut that is of the most important use for both species, it is also not necessary to obtain unblemished fruit.
Women agreed that the best method to harvest Gnetum while protecting the plant in the forests was to remove only the leaves from the vine without cutting the vine. In areas with fewer forest assets, where women collect in plantations or fallows, they said that the best technique was to collect the leaves by cutting the stem off and not uprooting the plant.
Collectors' knowledge of the regeneration rate of Gnetum appears to be considerable, but is dependent on the context of the respondent. When asked how long they would have to wait before returning to the same spot to collect leaves again, collectors of Gnetum gave a variety of responses, ranging from one week to nine months, although most (61.4 percent) said it would be within one month and 80.7 percent said it would be within a two-month period. This range of responses appears to be mainly affected by the areas from which they harvest and also the harvesting technique. Particularly in the Central Province, where the pressure on the plants is great, individuals collecting in fallows and plantations would perhaps have to wait longer to return to harvest as the small plants are cut off very low, close to the ground. In areas where collectors remove leaves from mature vines, the wait for regrowth may not be as long as the plant is left vigorous and healthy.
Applying the framework
In applying this analytical framework to the community-level stakeholders engaged in collecting, marketing and managing NWFPs, it is clear that there is no single organization or group that outperforms all others on all criteria. However, generally speaking, women and women's groups stand out as leading candidates for inclusion in a co-management contexts. It should also be noted, however, that men have organizational and administrative skills too, as shown by their membership in various groups.
Another important issue in managing common-pool resources is the capacity to enforce rules and regulations. Although all the groups have a mechanism in place to deal with group violations, there are mixed results as to the effectiveness of such rules. It appeared that women had more success in their informal groups in enforcing norms and rules of conduct.
Women, through their daily interaction with NWFPs, have a tremendous knowledge of the plants, of ways to protect them and of their state in the forest. It is diffi cult to say that this knowledge differs according to gender, since there were a limited number of men who agreed to respond to the questions about NWFPs on the survey. More in-depth study is needed to identify variables that affect the types and levels of knowledge held by different community members.
In summary, in community forestry in Cameroon, the co-management arrangement is between the forestry administration and the community. Based on the analytical framework, women have the potential to be effective partners in managing NWFPs in community forests. The fact that NWFPs are very important to women means that they are concerned about their long-term sustainable management. Women have organizational capacities, leadership ability and are able to enforce rules and regulations, all of which could contribute to the management process. Their high social capital will contribute to their ability to work together and foster the sharing of knowledge to advance learning and problem solving. With the dynamic nature of the situation regarding NWFPs in Cameroon, social learning will be essential to processes of adaptation to changing circumstances. The next step in research would be to determine how inclusion of such important stakeholders scheme designed to manage NWFPs in community forests.
Women are the key stakeholders involved in collecting and managing the study species. Recognizing that women are not a homogeneous, static group, further research would need to be done to assess the level of dependence on and interaction with NWFPs by different categories of women. Although men are not key stakeholders by virtue of their daily interaction with the resource, they are heavily implicated in access to and management of NWFPs through the traditional culture and tenure system (Diaw, 1997; Tiani, 2001) . Additionally, even if a man does not collect NWFPs himself, he shares in their benefi ts as someone else in the family, most often his wife or wives, collects for the household.
Men and women did not differ in their discount rate in relation to NWFPs, which likely refl ects the recognition by all members of a community of the importance of these products to their livelihoods, and therefore of the need to protect them for the future. It is clear that women are much more involved in informal groups, a proxy measure of social capital, where social learning occurs and social capital is built. Coupled with their stake in NWFPs, this would give women an advantage in functioning as part of a co-management arrangement for NWFPs in community forests.
Generally, women demonstrated high levels of capacity as measured in this analysis. Leadership in all the groups in the research communities seemed to strive to function in line with democratic principles. It is recognized, however, that more intensive study would perhaps reveal that democratic forms of decision making are not always realized. While some parts of traditional society tend to be fairly egalitarian, much of Cameroon society appears to be quite hierarchical, a structure that does not lend itself easily to democratic decision making.
Through their creation and involvement in tontines, women have developed organizational capacity that would be useful in other can be achieved and whether or not their inclusion results in more sustainable outcomes. Strategies for the inclusion of important stakeholders in such a governance system have already been explored by Brown (2005) .
IV Conclusions: The analytic framework as an assessment tool
The analytic framework we developed from the literature on the management of commonpool resources and development allowed us to synthesize insights on the promise of participatory natural-resource management. Analysing the qualifi cations of local actors who could be enlisted in co-management arrangements is a pathway toward improving outcomes in an era of decentralization in natural-resources management. Construction of a co-management arrangement based on the qualifi cations or competencies that stakeholders bring to the governance process is a departure from dominant approaches that rely on interest-based representation. We recognize, however, that our framework does not address all the criticisms and challenges of participatory management. In future research, there is a need to evaluate the performance of participatorygovernance arrangements derived from our framework, based on data on economic, social and ecological outcomes and to also analyse the involvement of external co-management partners, including state agencies. Despite not currently being in a position to rigorously test the effectiveness of our framework for evaluating local actors' abilities to contribute positively to environmental governance, we believe that our analytic approach and pilot test advance our understanding of an important institutional design challenge.
By using both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, we were able to access complementary sources of data to screen candidates for inclusion in a co-management scheme. Furthermore, the framework was tested using data from multiple sites, which is essential in cases such as the management of NWFPs in Cameroonian community forests. We seek to develop a means of practical assessment of those who have the potential to make a positive contribution to environmental governance. As previously stated, however, measurement of specifi c criteria in our assessment framework requires more theoretical and empirical work.
There are also some limitations to the application of such a protocol. Depending on the situation in which screening is conducted and who administers such screening, its administration could be viewed as a potential mechanism of social control. Therefore, in data collection and in its application, implementers must be sensitive to the ways in which procedures can affect outcomes. It is also important to recognize that a screening protocol designed to suggest who should be included in co-management arrangements invites explicit consideration of excluded stakeholders. It is important for those included in the co-management arrangement to demonstrate an ability to be aware of and, to the extent possible, address the concerns of those not directly participating in resource allocation and rule making. Such a commitment to inclusion can help to avoid potential sabotage by those who are excluded from participating formally.
Decentralization of management is recognized as an important strategy in contemporary environmental governance. The ability of co-management arrangements to produce sustainable outcomes is, however, premised on the construction of localized institutional capacity for deliberative policy analysis; critical, sustained and respectful dialogue supporting innovation. In complex, changing circumstances, the local actors to whom rights and responsibilities are allocated must learn and adapt. The effi ciency and effectiveness of learning and adapting are emergent properties of the four indicators included in our assessment framework, ultimately contributing to the increased integrity of both bio-physical and institutional ecosystems. Further development of analytical approaches to identifying suitable local co-management partners is likely to improve outcomes of participatory approaches to natural-resource management.
